Author: George

Theoretically, the United States and Iran are able to reach a consensus on the issue of a ceasefire. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is not a fanatical religious organization but a vested interest group that monopolizes violence, whose core demands are merely two points: 1. Ensure its own security; 2. Continue to earn money through oil exports. For the United States, its core demands can also be summarized as two points: 1. Iran must not possess nuclear weapons; 2. Ensure the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

It can be noted that there are no irreconcilable contradictions in the core demands of Iran and the United States. The reason Iran pursues nuclear weapons is due to concerns about a comprehensive invasion by the United States. If the United States no longer maintains hostility toward Iran, Iran would be willing to abandon nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. However, in reality, U.S.-Iran negotiations have been fraught with twists and turns, almost reaching a deadlock. The root cause lies in Iran's lack of trust in Trump; over the past decade, Trump has repeatedly torn up agreements and launched preemptive strikes against Iran. Therefore, even if the Trump administration promises not to launch a second invasion of Iran, Iran would not easily believe it.

During World War II, Nazi Germany tore up the Munich Agreement and brazenly invaded Czechoslovakia. This led to the complete bankruptcy of the Hitler government's diplomatic credibility, and the appeasement factions in Britain and France lost their voice. Trump often treats diplomacy as a joke; his diplomatic credibility is not much stronger than Hitler's, which artificially raises the threshold for negotiations between the U.S. and Iran. If the U.S. wants Iran to believe in the credibility of its diplomatic commitments, it can only replace Trump with a new government led by Vance to negotiate with Iran.

As long as Trump remains president, Iran will not trust the United States' sincere intention for peace. In this situation, there are only two ways to achieve peace: 1. Escalate the scale of war and decide the outcome through force; 2. A third party intervenes to mediate, balancing the interests of all parties. If it is the first scenario, the outcome is hard to predict, and neither the U.S. nor Iran has absolute assurance of victory. If it is the second scenario, China might play a key role.

Generally speaking, when country A and country B go to war, there are three ways for mediation:

1. Neutral mediation; assuming country C is strong enough and maintains good relations with both A and B, under such circumstances, countries A and B, based on trust, are willing to let country C act as an arbitrator. A typical example is China mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, where both countries chose Beijing as the venue due to China's good relations with both.

2. Coercive mediation; country C can exert pressure to force country A to accept the ceasefire agreement, otherwise country C will join forces with country B against A. In return, country B needs to concede interests to country C. A typical example is the "Tripartite Intervention to Return Liao" in 1895, where Russia pressured Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula to China. As a "reward," Russia was granted the right to build railroads in Manchuria.

3. Guarantee mediation; if country B lacks trust in country A, country C can intervene in negotiations, providing mutual guarantees. If in the future country A tears up the agreement, country C will provide necessary support to country B to alleviate B's concerns about the ceasefire. As compensation for the guarantee, countries A and B need to pay "rewards" to country C, such as diplomatic concessions. After Trump took office, he attempted to act as the guarantor for the Russia-Ukraine negotiations, with the U.S. overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire between the two. In exchange, the U.S. demanded concessions from Europe in the field of tariffs and sought overseas benefits from Russia.

Specifically regarding the U.S.-Iran ceasefire negotiations. Firstly, the neutral mediation model is not very applicable. During Merkel's tenure, the EU acted as a mediator between the U.S. and Iran, promoting the implementation of the Iran nuclear agreement in 2015. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Europe has become severely reliant on the U.S. for security; the EU has lost its neutrality in U.S.-Iran relations and is not suitable to continue acting as a mediator. It is similar to how Germany served as an arbitrator between Austria-Hungary and Tsarist Russia in the late 19th century, maintaining the existence of the "Triple Alliance" until its foreign policy increasingly favored Austria-Hungary, leading Tsarist Russia to ally with France. Currently, India maintains good relations with both the U.S. and Iran, but it has very weak voice in international affairs, and the U.S. and Iran are unlikely to accept India as a mediator.

If it is coercive mediation, the most likely mediator would be the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). For example, countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE could lead an ultimatum to Iran, demanding Iran lift the blockade of the Strait, threatening that otherwise GCC members will declare war on Iran. However, relying solely on the GCC's pressure may be insufficient to make Iran compromise, as Iran has the capability to launch large-scale attacks on its desalination plants; actual conflict would lead to mutual destruction.

Therefore, the most feasible option is guarantee mediation, with China and Russia stepping in to mediate and promote the signing of a long-term ceasefire agreement between the U.S. and Iran. Russia once attempted to act as a guarantor for the Iran nuclear agreement, using its management of Iran's enriched uranium as leverage to pressure the U.S. into ceding land to Ukraine. However, on the issue of the Strait blockade, Russia is reluctant to get too involved, as high oil prices can ease its financial pressures, and Putin is pleased to see the conflict drag on.

Thus, China might be the only country capable and motivated to implement guarantee mediation for the U.S.-Iran conflict. Currently, the barrier to U.S.-Iran negotiations is Iran's disbelief in U.S. commitments, hence China can provide security guarantees to Iran. If in the future Trump tears up the agreement and launches a second invasion, China can provide weapons to Iran for self-defense. As compensation for providing guarantees, the U.S. would need to make concessions to China in other geopolitical areas, such as: freezing arms sales to Taiwan, stopping support for the DPP authorities, and restraining Japan's rearmament process. On the other hand, while maintaining discounted crude oil exports to China, Iran needs to cooperate with China to repair relations with the GCC and ensure normal passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

In this process, China’s cost is the risk of providing security guarantees to Iran, while the main benefit is the potential geopolitical concessions the U.S. might make. If it can ensure that the benefits of U.S. geopolitical concessions outweigh the risks of providing security guarantees to Iran, then such guarantees would be worthwhile. But would the U.S. be willing to make deals with China to end the war? That is still uncertain.

From the perspective of the United States, not considering sunk costs, its optimal solution would be to rely on military means to secure the Strait of Hormuz and gain control over the Persian Gulf. Despite the possible significant costs involved, as long as it can defend the imperial credibility and the "oil-dollar" system, this cost would be justified.

However, from Trump’s perspective, there is a clear divergence between his personal interests and the national interests of the United States. Trump’s optimal solution is for Iran to voluntarily lift the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz without deploying ground troops, allowing the White House to present the withdrawal as a victory. As long as oil prices fall, Trump can reconnect with moderate voters; as long as the U.S. military does not suffer major casualties, Trump can soothe his MAGA base. In this way, Trump has a chance to salvage his midterm election prospects.

Based on U.S. interests, it would not make concessions to China to end the war against Iran; however, based on Trump’s interests, he might trade with China at the cost of national interests. Therefore, if the contradiction between Trump's personal interests and U.S. national interests can be fully utilized, our country might consider mediating the U.S.-Iran conflict to seize the price difference. This kind of contradiction in interests is also common in publicly traded companies, where executives adopt aggressive expansion strategies to garner lucrative rewards, while the risks are shared by shareholders. As America’s "professional manager," Trump might prioritize family interests over national interests.

However, such guarantee mediation also carries other risks. On one hand, due to the capricious nature of U.S. foreign policy, to prevent getting dragged into the quagmire of the Middle East, our country should limit the guarantee's validity period to Trump's term. On the other hand, the current conflicts between the GCC and Iran are extremely sharp, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE advocating that long-term pain is worse than short-term pain, trying to use U.S. power to implement regime change in Iran. Therefore, the guarantee to Iran should include key clauses: Iran must cooperate with China to proactively repair relations with the GCC and maintain open waterways in the Strait, to avoid further escalation of the situation.

If the U.S. refuses to make geopolitical concessions, or if Iran is unwilling to comply diplomatically, then our country should not intervene in U.S.-Iran mediation. The issue of the Strait blockade concerns all humanity; if Japan, South Korea, India, and Europe hide behind and do not contribute, it is inappropriate for our country to bear all the mediation risks. The longer the blockade lasts, the greater the impact on the aforementioned countries; at that point, we can just observe changes without intervening.

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